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Pseudomonas aeruginosa is a gram-negative, obligate
aerobic rod-shaped bacterium with minimal nutritional
requirements. It is often found in moist environments and
can cause infections in immunocompromised or other-
wise-susceptible hosts (1, 2). Numerous outbreaks have
been associatedwith faulty or unclean medical equipment
or products (39) and with personnel and environmental
reservoirs (1016), as well as with cross-contamination
within the hospital (13, 17, 18).
Hospital-acquired infections are costly for society,
because of patient suffering and are partly preventable.
Pseudomonas spp. are ranked among the top 10 causes of
bacteraemias in hospitals (1924). Medical devices have
often caused outbreaks.
In late February 2002, the Norwegian Institute of
Public Health (NIPH) was alerted to a possible increase
in the number of Pseudomonas infections in the clinical
wards of Norwegian hospitals, especially in intensive
care units (ICUs). Infection control personnel in
different hospitals had vague impressions of seeing
more Pseudomonas infections than normal. On 8 March
2002, investigators at St. Olav’s Hospital in Trondheim,
Norway, discovered genotypically identical strains of
P. aeruginosa in patient samples from two hospitals in
different regions, and 10 days later, they discovered a
genotypically identical strain from a third hospital in yet
another region. A national outbreak investigation was
launched.
The outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa was traced to a
mouth swab called Dent-O-Sept. This is a clean, non-
sterile, moist sponge-on-a-stick produced in Norway,
which according to the Norwegian text on the wrap is an
antiseptic single-use swab for mouth hygiene (Fig. 1).
The research originates from the results of the out-
break investigation. From it, four areas were explored:
(1) the outbreak investigation; (2) the contamination of
the medical device involved; (3) theories for causality
of the outbreak; and (4) the epidemiology of invasive
P. aeruginosa infection.
Paper I (25) describes the outbreak investigation of
P. aeruginosa infections, in particular how a nationwide,
multicentre investigation was organised and conducted.
The team work and combination of epidemiological and
microbiological methods were essential in finding the
cause and stopping the outbreak. A total of 231 patients
from 24 hospitals were identified with the outbreak strain
of P. aeruginosa; 71 of them died while hospitalised, and
for 34 the Pseudomonas infection probably contributed
to the patients’ deaths. Genotypically identical strains of
the bacterium were isolated from patients, several batches
of the Dent-O-Sept swab and from the production plant.
We concluded that susceptible patient groups should
use only documented quality-controlled, high-level
disinfected products and items in the oropharynx.
Paper II (26) describes the investigation of the swabs,
the moisturising liquid and the production facility.
A total of 76 swabs from 12 different batches produced
over a period of 30 weeks were contaminated with the
outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa. Many swabs were also
contaminated with other microbes. More than 250 of
1,565 examined swabs were contaminated with one or
more microbial species. A system audit revealed serious
breaches of production regulations. Biofilm formation in
the wet part of the production was proposed as the most
plausible explanation for the continuous contamination
of the swabs. The legal requirements for microbiological
purity of medical devices in Class 1 are not optimal.
Paper III (27) explores the theories for causality of the
outbreak of P. aeruginosa infections. Applying various
theories for causality and responsibility from different
fields, such as science, philosophy and law on the actors
and acts involved in the outbreak helped elucidating their
roles and responsibilities, especially legal theories and
counterfactual reasoning. We concluded that many
factors contributed to causing the outbreak, but that
contamination of a medical device in the production
facility was the major necessary condition. The reuse of
the medical device in hospitals contributed primarily to
the size of the outbreak. In addition, there were many
errors in the chain from the production of the swabs,
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care institutions to the use of the swabs and reporting of
defective devices. The unintended error by its producer 
and to a minor extent by the hospital practice  was
mainly due to non-application of relevant knowledge and
skills, and appears to constitute professional negligence.
Due to factors outside the discourse of causality, no one
was criminally charged for the outbreak.
Paper IV (28) investigates the epidemiology of invasive
P. aeruginosa infection in Norway. Although P. aeruginosa
usually does not cause infection in healthy persons, it
frequently does in patients with certain underlying
diseases, and in patients with disrupted barriers, espe-
cially in the ICU. Invasive P. aeruginosa infection is a rare
disease with an incidence rate of 3.16 per 100,000 person-
years at risk or 0.20 per 1,000 hospital stays, but very
serious for those contracting it with a 30-day case fatality
rate of 33%. Patients with malignant neoplasms of
lymphoid and haematopoietic tissue and other diseases
of blood and blood-forming organs have the highest risk
of infection. Prudent antibiotic use is one possible
explanation for much lower rates of infection in Norway
compared with all other published studies.
Lessons learned
Medical devices, moist equipment and solutions and
moist environments are frequently associated with out-
breaks with P. aeruginosa and related moisture-prone
bacteria. Lack of adherence to standard precautions for
infection control and prevention by hospital personnel
contributes to the propagation of these outbreaks.
Biofilm formation is possibly the more common of the
two distinct modes of behaviour for bacteria; the other
being the planktonic mode (2931). Bacterial biofilms are
less sensitive to disinfection and make it more difficult
to eradicate. Not abiding by the production regulations,
e.g. the requirement to have quality assurance systems
including an effective microbiological control system,
made the contamination possible in the production
process.
Outbreak investigations are essential to detect causes
of an outbreak and to gain experience in order to prevent
their recurrence. Investigating large, multicentre out-
breaks is resource demanding and necessitates a defined
network structure where everyone knows their role and
qualifications and try upmost to cooperate. Expertise in a
variety of fields is essential. Molecular finger-printing
techniques to identify the outbreak strain of the microbe
and discriminate against other strains have become an
indispensable part of most outbreak investigations.
This outbreak has necessitated a reassessment of the
guidelines for preventing infection in critically ill and
otherwise-susceptible patients. Oropharyngeal colonisa-
tion is important for the development of ventilator-
associated pneumonia, and oral care may prevent
pneumonia, but few have addressed whether oral
products other than ventilators or nebuliser equipment
need to be sterile or subjected to high-level disinfection
for this patient group. We conclude that sterility is not
necessary for such products, but only items for which
the manufacturer can document that quality control and
high-level disinfection have been performed (including
tap water and moist products) should be used in the
oropharynx for susceptible patient groups.
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